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The objective of this paper is to assemble on a systematic basis the available data on 
Asian countries and then analyse the relationship between growth and poverty reduction 
in a long-term perspective, as well as the impact of different macroeconomic variables on 
the intensity of this relationship. The results indicate that there is not only a strong 
positive relationship between growth and poverty reduction, but also that this relationship 
is highly variable across countries and time periods. The key macroeconomic 
determinants of the degree of pro-poor growth appear to be the rates of employment and 
agricultural growth. Inflation, at least up to a certain rate, does not impact poverty 
negatively, while the role of exports is essentially indirect through the contribution to the 
overall rate of economic growth. Examination of the change in policy stance of the Asian 
countries during the 1990s in relation to the 1980s demonstrates that on balance the mix 
of policies has not been pro-poor. The apparent sacrifice of growth in pursuit of 
macroeconomic stability has diminished the impact on poverty reduction. Given the 
relatively weak trade-off between inflation and growth with regard to the impact on 
poverty and the fact that inflation rates are currently low in the region, it is argued that 
countries can be more flexible in their policy stance with regard to the adoption of more 
growth-oriented as opposed to stabilisation policies. In particular, a case is made for 
resorting to a more expansionary counter-cyclical fiscal policy, led by higher levels of 
public investment, supported by appropriate monetary and exchange rate policies. The 
paper concludes with a detailed description of the policies designed to achieve faster 
agricultural development and greater employment generation. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between economic growth and the change in the incidence of 
poverty is both complex and multi-dimensional. An understanding of this 
relationship and its underlying determinants is the key to the formulation of 
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successful poverty reduction strategies. If it can be demonstrated that fast economic 
growth is always accompanied by rapid poverty reduction, as a result of the ‘trickle-
down’ effect, then such strategies can focus, more or less, exclusively on achieving 
faster growth. However, if this is not necessarily the case, then the pursuit of growth 
will have to be combined with an effort at achieving more pro-poor growth through a 
degree of redistribution of assets and incomes in the economy. This would have 
significant implications on the nature of anti-poverty strategies. 
A number of studies have attempted to analyse the relationship between 
economic growth and poverty incidence across countries and time periods [see 
Ravallion and Chen (1997); Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1998) and Adams (2003)]. 
It has been estimated that, on average, a one percentage point increase in the rate of 
per capita income growth can produce up to a two percent decrease in the proportion 
of people living below the poverty line, subject, of course to the process of income 
change being distribution-neutral in character. But inequality has tended to change in 
most situations and some countries have experienced limited poverty reduction 
despite impressive growth performance, while others have managed to decrease 
poverty significantly despite relatively low growth. 
The experience of Asian countries with regard to poverty reduction is 
mixed. Countries of East Asia have managed an exceptionally high average growth 
rate of per capita income of 6.4 percent, in the 90s, while the corresponding growth 
rate for the group of South Asian countries is 3.2 percent. The incidence of poverty 
has declined sharply in the former sub-region by 6.8 percent annually, whereas the 
rate of decline in South Asia has been relatively modest at about 2.4 percent. For 
the region as a whole, a one percentage point increase in the growth rate of per 
capita income has translated into only a 0.9 percent decline in the incidence of 
poverty. Clearly, inequality as a whole has worsened in the region during the 90s, 
and while it has been successful in achieving high rates of economic growth, gains 
with regard to poverty reduction have been limited by the absence of pro-poor 
growth.  
The Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations have committed 
the world to reducing the incidence of poverty by half by 2015 (in relation to the 
base year level of 1990). This implies that poverty will have to fall by about three 
percent per annum for the target to be achieved. If progress during the 90s is any 
guide, East Asia has already met this target; subject to no reversals in future years, 
but South Asia is not expected to achieve the target of halving poverty by 2015 on 
the basis of pat trends. It needs to be emphasised, however, that much of the 
breakthrough of East Asia is due to the remarkable strides made by China in poverty 
reduction. On the contrary, many countries of East Asia have also fallen behind in 
terms of achieving the poverty reduction target. 
The decade of the 90s has also witnessed qualitative changes in the growth 
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Some countries have just begun the transition from a highly centrally planned to a 
market economy while others have reached a fairly mature stage in this process. 
Many countries have started or intensified the implementation of various structural 
economic reforms, sometimes under the aegis of an IMF/World Bank structural 
adjustment programme or poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF), which have 
included trade liberalisation, financial sector reform, privatisation, deregulation and 
removal of restrictions on foreign private investment. While these changes may have 
resulted in faster economic growth it is not clear what the consequences have been 
on the rate of poverty reduction. In some countries, like Pakistan, Philippines and Sri 
Lanka, the process of poverty reduction has visibly slowed down. In others, periods 
of political or economic crises (like the East Asian financial crisis) have contributed 
to cases of rising poverty.
1 
The objective of this paper is to assemble on a systematic basis the 
available data on Asian countries and then analyse the relationship between 
growth and poverty on a long-term basis. Section 2 presents the trends in growth, 
income inequality and poverty incidence for different countries and different 
periods. These trends reveal the substantial variation in the relationship between 
growth and poverty, which is then explained on the basis of changes in the level 
of inequality. Section 3 studies the role of different potential macroeconomic 
determinants of poverty in the Asian context on the basis of simple statistical 
techniques.
2 Section 4 analyses the impact of different types of policies on the 
proximate determinants of poverty and highlights how different Asian countries 
have operated within the policy trade-offs with respect to poverty. Finally, 
Section 5 provides some concluding observations.  
Figure 1 highlights in schematic fashion the methodological approach 
adopted in the paper. According to this framework, various policies impact on 
macroeconomic determinants of poverty, with inflation likely to cause an 
increase in poverty, while income and employment growth expected to mitigate 
against poverty. A successful policy is one that operates on the right side of this 
trade off.  
 
1Out of the ten countries of Asia on which data is available on the incidence of poverty during 
the last two decades, the rate of poverty reduction has declined in the 90s in relation to the 80s in 
Philippines, while there has been a reversal in the poverty trend during the 90s, from a reduction in the 
80s, in Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Poverty incidence has increased over both 
decades in Nepal.  
2Econometric analysis involving the use of the OLS technique has also been tried. However, due 
to the limited number of observations, the results appear to be very sensitive to one or two observations 
and cannot, therefore, be judged as being robust in character. For example, the inclusion of Mongolia into 
the data dramatically alters the nature of the results because this country experienced a sharp increase in 
poverty in the 90s, arising from a fall in per capita income and a very high rate of inflation. Hence, 
regression results have not been presented here, though they indicate a negative and significant 
relationship between growth and poverty. Pasha and Palanivel  316 
















2.  GROWTH, INEQUALITY, AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
Before we quantify the relationship between growth and poverty in different 
settings, we proceed to describe the data. The sample consists of nine countries from 
East Asia (Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, 
Thailand, and Vietnam) and five from South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka). These countries account for 97 percent of the population 
and 77 percent of the gross national income of the whole of Asia. For all these 
countries data is available for the 90s, in most cases for the 80s and in some cases for 
the 70s. Changes are measured over the decades to remove the impact of random 
factors and to identify the underlying long-term relationships. Altogether, we are 
able to observe 32 ‘cases’, where a case relates to a particular country over a 
particular decade. 14 cases are for the 90s, 10 for the 80s and 8 for the 70s.  
Poverty estimates, based on national poverty lines, are used in the analysis. 
(For the justification behind using national poverty estimates rather than those based 
on the international poverty line of US $ 1 PPP per capita per day, see Appendix I). 
These estimates are given in Table A-1 in the Statistical Appendix. Annual rates of 
change in the incidence of poverty are computed by decade and presented along with 
the rate of per capita income growth in Table 1. It is interesting to note that out of the 
32 cases on which data is available, there are only nine cases in which poverty 
increased. This testifies to the success of Asian countries in reducing poverty, on 
average, during the last three decades. It is significant to note, however, that most 
cases of increasing poverty are concentrated in the 90s. This indicates greater 



















Policies  Proximate 
Macroeconomic 
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Table 1 
Rates of Per Capita Income Growth and Change in Incidence of Poverty in 
Sample Countries in Different Decades (%) 
































Bangladesh –  –  2.2  –0.6  3.0  –2.4 
Cambodia  – – – – 2.4  5.5 
China  4.4 –0.8  7.8 –9.8  9.0 –9.8 
India  0.8 –1.7  3.6 –2.2  3.6 –2.8 
Indonesia  5.4  –7.2 4.5  –6.1 2.9 2.1 
Lao  PDR  – – – – 3.7  –5.1 
Malaysia  5.3  –6.7 3.1  –4.2 4.6 2.9 
Mongolia –  –  –  –  –1.2  13.1 
Nepal  –  –  2.5 0.8 2.6 0.7 
Pakistan  1.5  –4.1 3.5  –1.3 1.4 2.8 
Philippines  3.1 –0.2 –0.6 –4.5  0.6 –1.3 
Sri  Lanka  2.7  –0.8 3.1  –7.1 3.9 4.8 
Thailand 4.1 –4.2  6.0  0.6  3.7 –2.3 
Vietnam  – – – – 5.8  –6.9 
Sources:  (i) Rate of Per Capita Income Growth: World Bank (2003), World Development Indicators.    
(ii) Rate of Poverty Incidence: from Table A-1 (Statistical Appendix). 
 
The strong relationship between growth and change in poverty is 
demonstrated by the fact that the fastest growing country, China (in the 80’s and 
90s), has shown the highest rate of decline in poverty while the slowest growing 
country, Mongolia (in the 90s), has experienced the largest rate of increase in 
poverty. In between, however, there appears to be much heterogeneity in the 
relationship, as revealed by the scatter diagram in Figure 2. There are countries, on 
the one hand, which despite showing only modest growth or even decline in per 
capita income were able to bring down poverty in particular periods. Examples of 
this are India (in the 70s) and Philippines (in the 80s and 90s). On the other hand, we 
observe cases where countries were unable to reduce poverty despite achieving fairly 
high rates of growth in per capita income. Thailand (in the 80s), Malaysia (in the 
90s) and Sri Lanka (in the 90s) are examples of such a failure. However, in the latter 
two cases the rise in poverty could be attributed to prevailing economic or political 
crises. Pasha and Palanivel  318 
Fig. 2. Scatter Diagram Relationship between Change in Incidence  
of Poverty (%) and Per Capita Income Growth (%). 
Per Capita Income Growth (%)










































In order to focus on the underlying relationship between growth and poverty 
and to remove the effect of individual country variations, we categorise the cases 
into two types, on the basis of growth rate of per capita income (above or below 3.5 
percent).
3 29 cases have been included in the analysis. Three cases have been 
excluded because of economic or political crisis during these periods.
4 The objective 
is to focus on the long-term relationship between growth and poverty in a ‘normal’ 
development situation. 
Results of this simple analysis are presented in Table 2. It appears that in 13 
cases of fast growth, the average rate of poverty reduction per annum was 4.9 
percent, whereas in cases of relatively slow growth there was only a marginal decline 
in poverty of 0.4 percent. Clearly, on the average, there is a well-defined relationship 
between growth and poverty reduction. It appears on the basis of this relationship 
that, on average, countries will have to achieve a growth rate in per capita income of 
about 3.5 percent if the MDG target of halving poverty in 25 years is to be attained. 
 
3The cut-off point used in deciding whether faster or slower growth (higher or lower inflation, 
higher or lower employment growth, etc.) is generally based on the average figure of our sample as well 
as on the international experience.  
4The three excluded cases are Indonesia, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka, all in the 90s—the first two 
because of the Asian financial crisis, and the last because of the serious conflict situation in the North and 
East of the country.  
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Table 2 





of Growth in 
Per Capita 
Income 







Fast Growth in Per 
Capita Income;  
  ( > 3.5% per annum)  13 5.1 –4.9  –0.96 
Slow Growth in Per 
Capita Income; 
  ( ≤ 3.5% per annum)  16 1.9 –0.4  –0.21 
Sources: Calculated from Table 1. 
 
Perhaps, the best way to capture the intensity of the relationship between 
economic growth and poverty is to compute the growth elasticity of poverty. This 
indicates the percentage change in the incidence of poverty associated with a one 
percent increase in per capita income. Estimates of this elasticity for the sample 
countries in different decades are given in Table 3. This Table demonstrates a wide 
variation in the elasticity estimates.  
 
Table 3 
Growth Elasticity of Poverty in Different Countries in Different Decades 
Country 1970s  1980s  1990s 
Bangladesh  –  –0.29 –0.81 
Cambodia   –  –  2.31 
China –0.18  –1.26  –1.09 
India –2.15  –0.60  –0.77 
Indonesia –1.33  –1.35  0.72 
Lao PDR  –  –  –1.37 
Malaysia –1.26  –1.36  0.63 
Mongolia   –  –  n.a 
Nepal –  0.33  0.27 
Pakistan –2.73  –0.38  2.01 
Philippines –0.07  n.a  –2.25 
Sri Lanka  –0.30  –2.28  1.24 
Thailand –1.02  0.10  –0.63 
Vietnam – –  –1.18 
Sources: Computed from Table 1. Pasha and Palanivel  320 
Three conclusions can be drawn from Table 3. First, the elasticity is both 
positive and negative. Positive elasticities are generally observed in cases where the 
growth of per capita income is low and poverty has increased. Second, the elasticity 
tends to be more negative in the case of countries, which experience faster growth. 
For example, when China’s growth rate soared in the 80s and 90s, the elasticity 
became substantially more negative as compared to the 70s. Third, the elasticity 
appears to be highly unstable in the case of individual countries over time. In the 
case of Sri Lanka it has varied from –0.3 in the 70s to –2.23 in the 80s. 
It is generally recognised that the extent to which the growth elasticity of 
poverty is negative is a good measure of the degree to which the growth process has 
been pro-poor. The basic question that arises then is: what determines the magnitude 
of this elasticity? Before we proceed to analyse what characteristics of growth 
determine the degree to which it is pro-poor, we explore the implications of changes 
in the level of inequality; trends in which are shown in Table A-2. Clearly, for a 
given growth rate, the implications for the level of poverty are likely to be more 
favourable if there is simultaneously a reduction in inequality such that the income of 
poor rises disproportionately in relation to the increase in average income in the 
economy. Alternatively, if the trickle down effect is weak and much of the gains in 
income are pre-empted by relatively well-off households, then the impact on poverty 
is likely to be limited.   
Table 4 focuses on four types of cases. The first category consists of cases in 
which a  country  experienced  rapid  growth,  but  simultaneously witnessed a rise in  
 
Table 4 
Relationship between Economic Growth, Inequality, and Poverty (%) 
  Number of Cases 
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Slow Growth in Per 
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Sources: Data taken from Table 1 and Table A-2 (Statistical Appendix). Pro-poor Growth and Policies  321 
income inequality. There are nine such cases, mostly in East Asia, with the notable 
exception of India in the 90s. It appears that in these cases the process of growth was 
robust enough to offset any negative consequence on poverty of worsening 
inequality since the average rate of decline in poverty was as high as 5.6 percent. 
This exceeds, on average, the rate of poverty reduction achieved by countries that 
experienced both fast growth and falling inequality primarily because the growth rate 
was much higher. Of particular interest is what happened at the other extreme—
when not only was growth slow but there was also a rise in inequality. Countries in 
this situation experienced on average an increase in poverty of close to one percent 
per annum.  
It is of significance to note that some countries have managed to reduce 
poverty fairly rapidly even in periods of relatively slow growth by ensuring that 
whatever gains ensue from this growth accrue relatively more to the poorer segments 
of the population. This is observed in five cases. For example, despite growth in per 
capita income of about three percent, Malaysia and Sri-Lanka in the 80s were able to 
reduce poverty annually by as much as four to seven percent due to falling 
inequality. It is not surprising that high growth elasticities of poverty are observed in 
these cases.  
A striking example of success in poverty reduction, despite slow growth 
(of less than two percent), is that of Pakistan during the decade of 70s. The 
largest negative value of 2.77 is observed in this case among the sample growth 
elasticities of poverty. This decade witnessed a rapid increase in labour 
migration of workers to the Middle East leading to a large and growing inflow of 
home remittances. At home, there was a vigorous expansion of the public sector, 
workers were given more rights and living standards of the poor were raised 
through enhanced budgetary outlays for subsidies on basic consumer items. 
However, it has been argued that the poverty reduction strategy adopted was 
fiscally unsustainable.  
 
3.  MACROECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF  
PRO-POOR GROWTH 
In the Asian context, the previous section has demonstrated that, although 
there exists a strong relationship between growth and poverty, this relationship is 
highly variable in character. We proceed now to examine the impact of different 
macroeconomic variables like the rate of inflation, employment growth, sectoral 
pattern of growth, etc., on the intensity of the relationship between growth and 
poverty. The approach adopted is to control for the rate of growth, and then to see 
the impact of variation in magnitude of a particular macroeconomic variable on the 
level of poverty.  Pasha and Palanivel  322 
Inflation  
It has been argued that inflation affects the poor directly through a decline in 
their real wages owing to the short-run rigidity of nominal wages. Also, if there are 
any savings, the poor mostly hold it in liquid form. Inflation generally reduces the 
real value of such holdings. If inflation is unanticipated, the poor will be harmed 
disproportionately as they have weaker bargaining power and are generally unable to 
hedge against inflation. On the contrary, since the poor are frequently indebted, the 
real cost of their debt falls with inflation. If the source of inflation is higher food 
prices, then this could have an ambiguous impact on the level of poverty. On the one 
hand, farmers who market their surplus food production, benefit, but on the other 
hand, the landless in rural areas and the urban poor are impacted adversely.  
Empirical findings on the effect of inflation on poverty, after controlling for 
the rate of economic growth, are, in fact, mixed. Agenor (2002) finds a statistically 
insignificant relationship between inflation rate and change in poverty. Datt and 
Ravallion (2002), using panel data on poverty from Indian states, show that inflation 
matters to India’s poor and attribute this effect primarily to adverse shocks on the 
real wage of unskilled labour.  
Table A-3 gives the rates of inflation in sample countries, while Table 5 
quantifies  the  average rate of change of poverty in different types of cases. The first  
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Sources: Calculated from Table 1 and Table A-3 (Statistical Appendix). Pro-poor Growth and Policies  323 
two types of cases relate to periods of fast economic growth, with the first type also 
witnessing double-digit rates of inflation and the second type having low rates 
(single digit) of inflation. There are six cases of the first type and seven of the second 
type. It is important to note that given this, more or less, equal distribution, fast 
growth appears to be as likely during periods of high inflation as low inflation. For 
example, China achieved a per capita income growth of as high as eight percent in 
the 80s when the inflation rate approached 12 percent. Similarly, during the 70s, the 
Indonesian economy averaged a growth rate in per capita income of almost 5.5 
percent in the presence of high inflation of almost 18 percent per annum. 
Comparison of the average rates of decrease in the incidence of poverty in the two 
types of cases reveals hardly any difference. 
We turn next to the other two types of cases, both corresponding to situations 
of slow economic growth. In seven cases, slow growth was accompanied by low 
inflation while in nine cases there was high inflation. Here again, we find that once 
the growth effect on poverty is controlled for, inflation has only a minor effect on 
poverty. Overall, the direct effect on the incidence of poverty of inflation does not 
appear to be significant in the Asian context, within the range of rates of inflation 
experienced.  
The lack of sensitivity of poverty to inflation is one of the potentially more 
important findings of the paper. It highlights that the trade-off faced by policies, 
fiscal or monetary, between growth and inflation from the viewpoint of impact of 
poverty is not as severe as has traditionally been thought to be the case. It appears 
that to the extent expansionary policies are resorted to with the objective of 
stimulating the process of growth, then any resulting inflation is likely to be less 
damaging on poverty. This clearly strengthens the case for pursuing expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policies at a time when space already exists, as inflation rates are 
currently low throughout the region. 
 
Employment Growth 
Employment is one of the main channels through which the link between 
economic growth and poverty reduction is established. As the level of income is the 
key determinant of poverty and as productive employment is the principal source of 
income, expanding gainful employment opportunities has to be a major element in 
the strategy of poverty reduction. This might be called the ‘employment nexus’ 
between growth and poverty. Unfortunately, the growth—employment—poverty 
linkage has not been adequately recognised in the pro-poor debate.  
Clearly, employment growth depends upon the growth of the economy. 
However, empirically a wide variation is observed in this relationship. The rate of 
employment growth is also influenced by the sectoral composition of economic 
growth, the choice of technology and the degree of effective functioning of the 
labour market. If economic growth is concentrated in sectors in which most of the Pasha and Palanivel  324 
poor work, then this is likely to have a positive impact on poverty reduction. Also, if 
the process of trade liberalisation leads to greater openness of the economy, the net 
impact on employment opportunities depends on how far employment is gained or 
lost in shifting resources from the non-tradable to the tradable sectors.  
Based on the data available, we test whether employment growth has any 
impact on the change in poverty, independently of the effect of economic growth on 
poverty. Table A-4 gives the rate of employment growth in sample countries. As 
before, we distinguish four types of cases depending upon the rate of growth of per 
capita income (fast or slow) and the rate of employment growth (fast or slow). There 
is substantial variation in the rate of employment growth. For example, the growth 
rate of the Chinese economy was higher in the 90s in relation to the 80s, but while 
employment grew at almost 5 percent in the latter period, it increased by only 1 
percent during the 90s, despite faster growth. As opposed to this, in the presence of 
relatively slow growth, Sri Lanka was able to achieve almost a 4 percent growth in 
employment during the 80s.  
Results of the analysis presented in Table 6 clearly demonstrate the 
importance of employment growth in influencing the rate of change in the incidence 
of poverty, after controlling for the effects of economic growth on poverty. In the 
seven  cases  where  both rapid economic and employment growth was observed, the 
 
Table 6 















Fast Growth in Per Capita
Income;  
  Rapid Employment Expansion  
  (≥ 2.5 % per annum)  7  3.3  –5.4  –1.02 
Fast Growth in Per Capita
Income;  
  Slow Employment Expansion 
  (< 2.5% per annum)  6  1.8  –4.2  –0.84 
Slow Growth in Per Capita
Income;  
  Rapid Employment Expansion   7  3.1  –2.0  –0.91 
Slow Growth in Per Capita
Income;  
  Slow Employment Expansion  9 1.8 0.9 0.53 
Sources: Calculated from Table 1 and Table A-4  (Statistical Appendix). Pro-poor Growth and Policies  325 
average rate of decline was close to 5.5 percent, whereas in the six cases where fast 
growth was accompanied by relatively slow employment growth, the rate of fall in 
poverty was 4.2 percent. The importance of employment growth in contributing to 
poverty reduction appears to be even more pronounced in situations where the 
overall pace of economic growth is slow. We observe seven cases where 
employment growth in excess of 2.5 percent per annum was achieved despite a 
growth in per capita income of less than 3.5 percent. Poverty declined on the average 
in these cases by 2 percent. As opposed to this, in the nine cases of both slow 
economic and employment growth, poverty increased on an average by almost 1 
percent per annum. These results confirm the view that employment growth is a key 
element in pro-poor growth. 
 
Agricultural Growth 
There is a substantial body of literature that argues that it is not only the 
overall growth that matters for poverty reduction, but that the pattern of growth also 
matters [see Ravallion (2001); Datt and Ravallion (2002)]. In particular, since bulk 
of the poverty is rural in character, agricultural growth has a crucial role to play in 
the process of poverty reduction, through both its direct effect within the rural 
economy and through the spill over effects on the urban economy. Very few 
countries in the world have experienced rapid and sustained growth without 
agricultural growth either preceding or accompanying it. As highlighted by the 
UNDP Global Human Development Report (1997), strong agricultural growth has 
been a feature of countries that have successfully reduced poverty at different times. 
We test, therefore, for the direct effect of agricultural growth after controlling for the 
overall rate of growth. The hypothesis is that for the same rate of economic growth, 
the impact on poverty is likely to be more pronounced the faster the rate of 
agricultural growth.  
Table A-5 gives the rate of agricultural growth in sample countries. It is 
interesting to note that in ten cases where rapid agricultural growth occurred along 
with overall rapid economic growth, poverty fell sharply in all these cases, by almost 
6 percent per annum, as shown in Table 7. As opposed to this, in the three cases 
where agriculture lagged behind other sectors in achieving rapid growth, the 
performance with respect to poverty reduction was more modest, at about 2 percent 
per annum. The evidence points to the fact that progress in bringing down poverty 
was retarded (China in the 70s, India during the 80s and 90s and Thailand in the 90s) 
due to slow progress of agriculture during these periods. 
We also observe seven cases where although the overall growth performance 
was relatively poor, agriculture performed strongly, showing a growth rate in excess 
of 3 percent. On average, in these cases, the rate of decline in poverty was 0.7 
percent per annum. Of particular significance is the fact that although the agricultural 
sector of Pakistan has done exceptionally well during the last two decades,  it has not Pasha and Palanivel  326 
Table 7 
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Sources: Calculated from Table 1 and Table A-5 (Statistical Appendix). 
 
made a significant dent on rural poverty in the country, and thereby on poverty 
overall. In a recent paper, Malik (2003) has argued that this is due to a number of 
reasons, such as the high level of inequality, the lack of non-farm employment 
opportunities and a decline in the real wages of the rural poor as mechanisation has 
reduced labour demand. In the nine cases of both slow economic and agricultural 
growth, poverty incidence remained stagnant.  
 
Export Growth 
The relationship between trade liberalisation, as reflected by a greater 
emphasis on seeking export markets, and poverty reduction and inequality both 
within countries and at the global level, has been one of the most prominent elements 
of the current debate on pro-poor growth. This debate is reflected in a study 
published by the WTO Secretariat in 2000 on Trade, Income Disparity and Poverty. 
While there is generally a consensus that expansion of exports can make to faster 
economic growth, there is less clarity on the direct impact of exports on poverty, 
once we control for the overall rate of growth.  Pro-poor Growth and Policies  327 
In a comprehensive paper, Winters (2000) identifies several key linkages 
between trade liberalisation and poverty. He highlights the fact that trade tends 
to alter relative product and factor prices, so its net effect on poverty reduction 
depends also on the signs of these relative product and factor price changes. For 
example, if exports are primarily of labour-intensive manufactures, then they 
could bid up the relative wages of unskilled and semi-skilled labour, thereby 
contributing to poverty alleviation. This appears to be the experience of East 
Asia in earlier decades. However, during the 90s, trade liberalisation seems to 
have led to the emergence of urban ‘enclaves’, with beneficiaries consisting 
primarily of those directly involved in export activities and the limited auxiliary 
service functions that developed around these activities. For example, 
information technology exports from India and exports of garments from 
countries such as Bangladesh and Cambodia have remained restricted to a few 
urban centres. In the case of latter, exports have not contributed much to value 
added because of high import content. The absence of backward and forward 
linkages has meant that the employment generation due to export expansion has 
not been significant.  
Table A-6 gives the rate of export growth in sample countries. Here again, we 
distinguish among four types of cases depending upon the rate of economic growth 
(fast or slow) and rate of expansion of exports (fast or slow). For fast growing 
countries, the rate of poverty reduction appears to be mildly sensitive to export 
performance, as shown in Table 8. However, a counter-intuitive result is that among 
cases of slow growth, greater buoyancy of exports can actually contribute to a lower 
rate of reduction of poverty.  
Nonetheless, our findings on the impact of export performance on poverty are 
in line with some recent empirical studies. For example, studies such as Agenor 
(2002); Ghura, et al. (2002); Epaulard (2003) find that, once the effect of overall 
income has been taken into account, trade openness has no significant direct 
influence on poverty incidence or on the income of the poor or on the elasticity of 
the poverty with respect to growth. Overall, it appears that export growth does not 
have a significant direct impact on poverty. Its effect has to be seen primarily via its 
bearing on the overall rate of economic growth. Therefore, exports cannot be said to 
play a significant role in influencing the extent to which the process of growth is pro-
poor or not.  
Based on the above analysis, it appears that the key macroeconomic 
determinants of the degree of pro-poor growth are employment growth and 
agricultural growth. Inflation, at least up to a certain rate, does not seem to matter in 
negatively impacting on poverty while the role of exports is essentially indirect 
through its contribution to the overall rate of economic growth. Altogether, a 
successful poverty reduction strategy will need to focus on achieving a high and 
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Table 8 

















Fast Growth of Per Capita 
Income;  
  Rapid Export Expansion        
( ≥ 10% per annum)  7 15.9  –5.2  –0.91 
Fast Growth in Per Capita 
Income;  
  Slow Export Expansion         
(< 10% per annum)  6  7.0  –4.5  –0.98 
Slow Growth in Per Capita 
Income;  
  Rapid Export Expansion  7 12.9  –0.1  –0.04 
Slow Growth in Per Capita 
Income;  
  Slow Export Expansion  9 5.8  –0.6  –0.33 
Sources: Calculated from Table 1 and Table A-6 (Statistical Appendix). 
 
characteristics: high rate of employment generation and rapid agricultural growth.
5 
These appear to be the key conclusions drawn from the Asian experience vis-à-vis 
poverty reduction during the last three decades.
6 
 
4.  PRO-POOR POLICIES 
We turn now to the role of policies in influencing the magnitude of 
macroeconomic determinants of growth and the extent to which it is pro-poor. The 
empirical analysis in the previous section has demonstrated that from the viewpoint 
of poverty reduction in Asia the stance of policies can be oriented more towards 
faster economic growth rather than lowering of inflation within the overall inflation-
growth trade-off. Apparently, poverty in the region is more sensitive to the rise in 
 
5Looking at the two extremes we observe that in the six cases of fast growth per capita income 
combined with fast employment and agricultural growth, the average rate of decline annually in the 
incidence of poverty was as high as seven percent. These cases are: China (80s); Indonesia (70s); 
Malaysia (70s); Thailand (70s); Vietnam (90s) and Lao PDR (90s). As opposed to this, in the eight cases 
where slow growth of per capita income was accompanied by both slow agricultural and employment 
growth, poverty increased on the average at the rate of one percent per annum.  
6In order to test whether these findings are driven mainly by China or/and India, we carried out 
these exercises without China as well as without both China and India. The results are, more or less, the 
same in these exercises too.   Pro-poor Growth and Policies  329 
real income than prices. This is an important finding and indicates that in the 
stabilisation versus growth debate, the ‘Washington Consensus’ view is at one 
extreme and, by and large, countries can be more flexible in their policy posture with 
regard to the adoption of more growth oriented policies.  
Examination of the change in policy stance of the Asian countries during the 
90s in relation to the 80s yields some important conclusions: 
  (i)  The size of the fiscal deficit (as a percentage of the GDP) has fallen in 
most of the sample countries, with the exceptions of Cambodia and Lao 
PDR, as shown in Table A-7. However, the path to fiscal adjustment has 
been achieved in different ways. Some countries such as Bangladesh and 
Philippines have opted to use part of their revenue gains to bring down 
their fiscal deficit and the remaining part to raise the level of public 
expenditure. Nepal and Vietnam have managed significant increases in the 
revenue to GDP ratio, but have combined this with a containment of 
public expenditure to achieve significant lowering of the fiscal deficit. 
    There has been a visible slackening of resource mobilisation effort in a 
number of countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka. These countries have been compelled to make major cutbacks in 
public expenditure in order to contain the fiscal deficit. In the case of 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka, capital expenditure as a percentage of the GDP 
has fallen by almost half. It is likely that in such cases fiscal policy has 
exerted a strong negative influence on the process of growth.  
  (ii)  Monetary policy has tended to be less expansionary in the majority of the 
sample countries. In relation to the 80s, the rate of expansion in money 
supply has been lower or, more or less, the same during the 90s, with the 
exception of Malaysia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, as shown in Table A-8. 
Consequently, real interest rates have been high, and have shown a 
tendency only in recent years to fall sharply. The tightening of monetary 
policy throughout the region appears to have been largely motivated by the 
objective of containing inflation and the need to avoid any balance of 
payment difficulties. It is, therefore not surprising that inflation rates have 
been lower in the majority of sample countries in the 90s (see Table A-3). 
Two countries, Indonesia and Pakistan, have experienced higher inflation, 
arising in the latter case from the pressure exerted on the money supply by 
runaway government borrowing in the first half of the decade. In the case 
of Indonesia, inflation spiralled in the aftermath of the East Asian financial 
crisis, as the GDP plummeted and the exchange rate depreciated 
significantly.  
  (iii) There has been much more action during the 90s in the area of trade 
liberalisation and exchange rate policies. Import tariffs, on average, at the 
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decade in Bangladesh, about one-half in India, and one-third in Pakistan 
and Thailand, one-fifth in Philippines, and so on. Simultaneously, most 
countries have operated a managed floating exchange rate regime and 
allowed their currency to depreciate in real terms at a faster rate than in the 
80s with the exception of Bangladesh, China, Philippines and Lao PDR, as 
shown in Table A-9. The objective clearly was to stimulate exports and 
limit the size of any trade deficit. Most countries did, in fact, experience 
an upsurge in exports. For example, the growth rate of exports in countries 
such as India, Philippines and Vietnam more than doubled. A relative 
stagnation of exports was observed only in the case of Pakistan. 
What are likely to have been the implications of these policy choices on the 
level of poverty in the region? South Asia, as a whole, grew somewhat less rapidly 
that it did in the 80s. East Asia did show faster growth, but due primarily to the 
exceptional growth performance of China, while other countries like Indonesia and 
Thailand, which were impacted by the East Asian financial crisis, experienced a 
significant decline in growth. Part of the fall in growth rates is clearly due to a resort 
to contractionary fiscal and monetary policies in pursuit of stabilisation. Another key 
development was the change in sources of growth, arising from the shift in emphasis 
from raising domestic demand through fiscal and monetary stimuli towards tapping 
into foreign demand, through exports, by adopting aggressive trade and exchange 
rate policies. 
On balance, the mix of policies does not appear to have been pro-poor. The 
sacrifice of growth in pursuit of macroeconomic stability, implied by a lower rate of 
inflation, has diminished the impact on poverty. Export buoyancy has certainly 
contributed to faster growth, thereby indirectly resulting in lowering poverty. However, 
as demonstrated earlier, exports have not done much directly to alleviate poverty. This 
is primarily due to the failure of exports to stimulate faster growth of employment. 
Exports of manufactures from the region grew rapidly in the 90s and this contributed to 
the fast growth of the industrial sector; employment, however in this sector, failed to 
respond. A classic example of such a failure is observed in the case of Bangladesh. 
Exports from this country, mostly of manufactured goods like garments, grew by 
almost 12 percent per annum in the 90s and the industrial sector expanded at the rate of 
7 percent, but industrial employment fell by close to 4 percent. 
Given that fiscal deficits have fallen in most countries and interest rates have 
shown a strong tendency to decline recently, while foreign exchange reserves have 
generally tended to go up in the region, there is a strong case for providing a fiscal 
stimulus to achieve faster growth. Such a stimulus is unlikely to ignite inflationary 
pressures at a time when inflation rates are generally down to low single digit levels, 
as shown in Table A-3. A modest enhancement in the inflation rate is unlikely to 
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The fiscal stimulus should come in the form of a boast to public investment, 
which has been curtailed in many countries during the 90s. Such public investment 
should be used for human development and physical infrastructure of direct benefit 
to the poor. The allegation that higher public investment could ‘crowd out’ private 
investment is not borne out by the facts. In many countries of the region buoyant 
private investment has gone hand in hand with major increases in public investment. 
The best examples of this complementary relationship are seen in China and 
Vietnam. If anything, the evidence points to a ‘crowding in’ through the familiar 
multiplier effect and the impact of higher profit expectations and cost reductions 
associated with improved infrastructure. Countries that have limited the investment 
role of the public sector such as, Cambodia, Indonesia, Nepal, and Pakistan have 
experienced an inferior investment performance by the private sector.  
Therefore, the function of fiscal policy must be one of helping the economy 
achieve its potential and sustain a higher growth rate via a redistribution of income at 
the margin in order to increase the elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to 
growth. Public investment is the key to these goals since it increases capacity, and 
can be designed to do so in a way that biases income gains to the poor.  
It needs to be emphasised, however, that there are limits in special 
circumstances to the use of expansionary fiscal policy, involving deficit financing of 
higher public investment outlays. If the government has a burden of large internal or 
external debt, then such a policy may lead to an unsustainable fiscal position. It is 
sometimes argued that this is the situation in Indonesia. However, when GDP growth 
is significantly lower than the potential long-run growth rate, there is definitely a 
case for using fiscal policy, at least temporarily as a counter-cyclical measure. 
Another argument that has been put forward is that the use of fiscal policy should be 
limited in the presence of ‘governance’ failure arising from corruption and problems 
in implementation of public sector projects. In such situations, improvements in 
governance have to go hand in hand with the conduct of a more active fiscal policy.  
Thailand has discovered an ingenious way of increasing aggregate demand in the 90s 
by adopting an ambitious programme of fiscal decentralisation.  
As far as monetary policy is concerned, it is necessary to maintain a stance of 
this policy that sustains the recent fall in interest rates in the region. As highlighted 
earlier, with inflation rates generally down, there exists considerable space for 
resorting to an expansionary monetary policy. Exchange rate policy should aim at 
preventing an overvaluation of the currency, to avoid loss of competitiveness. 
Currently, many countries in the region are showing symptoms of the ‘Dutch 
disease’, involving appreciation of the currency resulting from a rapid build up of 
foreign exchange reserves.  
We now discuss below how fiscal, monetary and other policies can jointly be 
used to further the goals of faster agricultural development and employment 
absorption, which have demonstrated to be key elements of a pro-poor growth 
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Policies for Agricultural Development 
Over the past few decades, Asian agriculture has demonstrated remarkable 
resilience. The spectre of population growth outstripping agriculture’s ability to meet 
human needs has not materialised. Food prices have secularly declined on a long-
term basis in the region. However, growth of agricultural output has slowed down 
both in East Asia and South Asia during the 90s as compared to the 80s. East Asian 
agriculture grew at close to five percent in the 80s, which has fallen to about three 
percent in the 90s, whereas agriculture in South Asia rose by 3.5 percent in the 80s 
and has come down to three percent in the 90s. This has fundamental implications 
for the rural poor, whose share in the total number of poor ranges from 66 percent in 
Indonesia to 94 percent in Nepal. 
China’s remarkable success in poverty reduction during the initial years after 
the systemic land reforms in 1979 was largely because of a sharp improvement in 
agriculture’s terms of trade and an increase in public expenditure for the rural 
economy. Rural communes were dismantled, land was parcelled to households on an 
essentially egalitarian basis, farmers were encouraged to abandon the previous ‘grain 
first’ policy and to diversify production, and farm prices rose substantially along 
with a large increase in chemical fertiliser supplies. When China shifted gears in the 
late 80s to a development strategy oriented towards exports with concentration of 
economic activity in the coastal region, the process of growth became noticeably less 
pro-poor. Similarly, when India experienced relatively fast agricultural growth 
(mainly due to the green revolution) in the 70s and in the first half of the 80s, 
poverty declined despite a relatively low rate of economic growth. However, the 
slowdown in agricultural growth in the 90s, despite high economic growth, has had 
an adverse impact on poverty reduction. Further, the astonishing egalitarian and 
poverty alleviating growth in Indonesia during the 70s and the 80s was principally 
due to a diversion of a high proportion of public investment towards the rural areas, 
and to reforms of the domestic trade and marketing regime, which led to an 
improvement of the agricultural terms of trade.  
These examples reveal that if economic growth is to be favourable to the poor, 
then it should have a pattern that directs resources to the sectors in which the poor 
work (agriculture), areas in which they live (relatively backward regions), factors of 
production which they possess (unskilled labour) and outputs which they consume 
(such as food).  
Policies for promoting faster agricultural development will have to focus on 
the following:  
  (i)  Diversification of agriculture into labour-intensive high-value agricultural 
commodities such as horticulture and livestock for increased profit 
incentives and employment opportunities. This may require intervention 
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minimum support prices to help farmers manage the risks of moving into 
new economic activities.  
  (ii) Strengthening of the backward and forward linkages between the 
agricultural sector and the off-farm sector in the rural areas in order to 
create a virtuous cycle of growth of incomes and employment. This is 
what happened in the countryside of China during the 80s and largely 
explains the phenomenal employment growth during this period. 
Development of small and medium-scale rural enterprises for agri 
processing and provision of agricultural inputs will require greater 
outreach for extension of rural credit, both farm and off-farm, by financial 
institutions, specialised or otherwise.  
  (iii)  Higher priority in public sector allocations to rural development. In fact, 
during the 90s, the share of government spending on agriculture has 
declined sharply throughout the region. For example, it has fallen in 
Indonesia from over 16 percent in the mid-80s to only four percent in 
recent years, from 11 percent to four percent in Sri Lanka, from 19 percent 
to 11 percent in Nepal, and so on. This trend will have to be reversed. 
Numerous studies have been undertaken to find out what kind of public 
expenditure caters most to needs of the rural poor. It appears that the 
greatest impact on agricultural productivity and poverty comes from 
investment in roads, irrigation, village electrification, and from outlays on 
agricultural research and development and extension.  
  (iv) Focus on redistribution of assets to the poor. This will also include the 
possibility of progressive land reform in countries, like Nepal, Philippines 
and Pakistan, where agricultural land is unevenly distributed. In addition, 
rural micro-credit schemes, of the type in Bangladesh, can endow the 
poor, especially women, with some basic assets.  
 
Policies for Employment Generation 
The share of employment in agriculture is currently high in most countries of 
the region. For example, at one extreme, in less developed countries like Cambodia 
and Bangladesh, the share of employment in agriculture is close to three-quarters. As 
opposed to this, the share of employed in industry is relatively small (in the range of 
six to 20 percent) in most countries. The data on employment reveals that, contrary 
to expectations, in some countries such as Bangladesh, India, Mongolia and Pakistan, 
the industrial sector’s share in employment has declined during the 90s. A substantial 
increase in employment share is observed only in the services sector of most 
countries.  
However, as a consequence of slow growth of formal (organised) sector jobs 
in the modern industrial sector and increasing labour supply pressure in agriculture, 
there has been enormous pressure put on informal sector activities. This has Pasha and Palanivel  334 
translated into falling labour productivity and income levels in the services sector. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that one- half of the poor consist of employed workers 
due to part-time work, low wages and frequently hazardous working conditions. 
Mega cities of Asia have witnessed an explosion of the informal sector and 
‘urbanisation’ of poverty is an ongoing phenomena.  
Policy-makers have generally had an ambivalent attitude towards the informal 
sector, recognising, on the one hand, the problems that it poses in terms of tax 
evasion, illicit activities, adverse impact on the environment, etc., and, on the other 
hand, accepting that it acts as a cushion for the poor in terms of at least providing 
some minimum livelihood. While regulation will need to be improved to avoid some 
of the evils, it is clear that the informal sector will also have to be supported through 
provision of better physical infrastructure and other government facilities. 
Simultaneously, the progressive and dynamic end of the informal sector consisting of 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs), frequently engaged in export, will need to be 
encouraged by improved access to management and technical extension services and 
to credit from the banking system.  
China provides an excellent example of how a development strategy focusing 
on SMEs can play an important role in growth and employment. The experience of 
Bangladesh is also illustrative in this regard. In the 90s, Bangladesh was able to 
accelerate the rate of poverty reduction mainly by employment generation in non-
tradable sectors (i.e. construction small-scale industry, services etc.). 
Within rural areas, much of the focus on employment generation will have to 
be on the off-farm sector, as discussed above. Several countries—notably 
Bangladesh and India—have used rural public works programmes as an effective 
method of providing employment to poor workers, especially on a seasonal basis.  
Beyond this, the overall policy environment will have to be one that promotes 
a higher labour intensity of growth. This will include the development of a system of 
incentives and institutions that avoids undesirably high capital intensity of 
investment (e.g. maintenance of an overvalued exchange rate that permits the import 
of cheap machinery, the promotion of large mechanised corporate farms instead of 
small holders, making intensive use of family labour).   
Reducing vulnerability due to labour market conditions could also be useful in 
the context of reducing poverty among the working poor. Legal and institutional 
reforms will be needed to address the various factors contributing to vulnerability. A 
recent ILO study provides strong support to the idea that minimum wage would 
bring positive results in poverty alleviation. The study shows that the minimum wage 
has a small disemployment effect, while providing unskilled workers with decent 
living conditions [Saget (2001)]. Similarly, social protection can help workers adapt 
to both cyclical and structural change. In many developing countries, social 
protection systems tend to cover only workers in formal full-time employment, 
leaving most of the workers with no protection. Hence, new mechanisms to extend 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
The Asian experience reveals a strong, though variable, relationship between 
growth and poverty. For the region as a whole, the growth elasticity of poverty is 
estimated at –0.9 during the 90s as compared to a distribution-neutral elasticity of –2. 
The divergence is attributed to worsening inequality. It appears that while the region 
has been successful in achieving high rates of economic growth, gains with regard to 
poverty reduction have been limited by the absence of pro-poor growth.  
Analysis of the macroeconomic determinants of pro-poor growth like the rate 
of inflation, employment growth and sectoral pattern of growth leads to some 
important, perhaps unexpected, findings. Once the effect of growth on poverty is 
controlled for, the level of poverty does not appear to be sensitive to the rate of 
inflation, at least up to the level experienced by most Asian countries. Similarly, 
while greater exports indirectly impact upon poverty via faster growth, the direct 
relationship with poverty seems to be limited. The empirical evidence indicates that 
the key macroeconomic determinants of the degree of pro-poor growth are the rates 
of agricultural growth and employment generation.  
Based on these findings, the paper recommends a set of pro-poor policies. 
Given the relatively weak trade-off between inflation and growth with regard to the 
impact on poverty and the fact that inflation rates are currently low, it is argued that 
countries can be more flexible in their policy stance with regard to the adoption of 
more growth-oriented as opposed to stabilisation policies. In particular, a case is 
made for resort to a more expansionary counter-cyclical fiscal policy, led by higher 
levels of public investment, supported by appropriate monetary and exchange rate 
policies. The paper concludes with a detailed description of the policies designed to 
achieve faster agricultural development and greater employment generation.  
 




Incidence of Poverty in Different Countries in Different Years, 
according to National Poverty Line (% of Population) 
Country  1970 1980 1990 2000 
Bangladesh  71.0  (73) 52.3 (83) 49.7 (91) 39.8  
Cambodia –    –   39.0 (94)  51.1 (99) 
China 33.0   31.0 (78)  9.0   3.2  
India 55.6   48.4 (78)  38.9 (88)  28.6 (99) 
Indonesia  60.0   26.5 (81)  15.1  18.2 (99) 
Lao PDR  –    –   53.0   31.5  
Malaysia 18.0    9.0   6.1 (89)  8.1 (99) 
Mongolia –    –   17.0 (92)  35.6 (98) 
Nepal –    36.2 (77)  40.0 (89)  42.0 (96) 
Pakistan 46.5    30.7 (79)  26.1 (91)  32.6 (99) 
Philippines  61.6  (71) 59.7 (85) 45.2 (91) 40.0  
Sri  Lanka 37.0  (63) 30.9 (85) 19.9 (91) 25.2 (96) 
Thailand  26.0   17.0  18.0  14.2  
Vietnam –    –  75.0 (88)  32.0 (02) 
Source: UNDP (2003b); ESCAP (2002); ESCAP and UNDP (2003) and World Bank (2004). 
Note: Figure in the parenthesis corresponds to the year of poverty level. 
 
Table A-2 
Level of Inequality in Sample Countries in Different Years (Gini Coefficient %) 
Countries 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Bangladesh  36.8  (73) 39.0 (81) 28.9 (89) 31.8  
Cambodia –    –   37.4   40.4 (97) 
China  27.9   32.0  34.6  40.3 (98) 
India  30.4   31.5 (83)  29.7  37.8 (97) 
Indonesia  30.7   31.8  33.1  30.3  
Lao PDR  –    –   30.4 (92)  37.0 (97) 
Malaysia 51.8    51.0 (79)  48.3 (89)  49.2 (97) 
Mongolia –    –   37.4   44.0 (98) 
Nepal –    30.1 (84)  33.4 (89)  36.7 (96) 
Pakistan 33.0   37.3 (79)  40.7  33.0 (98) 
Philippines  48.3  (71) 46.1 (85) 47.7 (91) 46.1  
Sri  Lanka  31.2   42.0  30.1  34.4 (96) 
Thailand 49.9  (71)  47.3 (81)  42.9   43.2  
Vietnam –   –   35.7 (92)  36.1 (98) 
Source: UNDP (2003a); UNDP (2003b) and World Bank (2003). 
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Table A-3 
Rate of Inflation in Sample Countries in Different Decades (%) 
Country 1970s  1980s  1990s  2000–2002 
Bangladesh –  7.4  5.2  2.5 
Cambodia –  –  5.4 –0.7 
China 10.0  11.8  7.5  0.3 
India  8.2 8.9 9.1 3.8 
Indonesia  17.5 8.6  14.1 7.6 
Lao PDR  –  –  34.1  16.4 
Malaysia 6.0 3.2 3.6 1.5 
Mongolia –  –  65.6  9.8 
Nepal –  10.2  8.9  2.1 
Pakistan  12.4 7.0 9.2 3.8 
Philippines 14.9  13.7  8.6  5.2 
Sri  Lanka 8.9 12.4  9.7 10.2 
Thailand  10.0 4.4 4.5 1.6 
Vietnam –  –  3.7  –1.1 




Rate of Employment Growth in Sample Countries in Different Decades (%) 
Country 1970s  1980s  1990s 
Bangladesh –  2.3 1.4 
Cambodia – –  2.8 
China 2.2  4.7  1.1 
India 2.1  2.2  2.4 
Indonesia 2.5  3.0  1.8 
Lao PDR  –  –  2.9 
Malaysia 3.2  3.4  3.2 
Mongolia – –  0.6 
Nepal –  1.8  3.1 
Pakistan 3.1  2.0  2.1 
Philippines 2.9 2.9 2.1 
Sri Lanka  2.1  3.6  2.2 
Thailand 3.1  3.1  0.4 
Vietnam –  –  2.9 
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Table A-5 
Rate of Agricultural Growth in Sample Countries in Different Decades (%) 
Country   1970s   1980s  1990s 
Bangladesh –  2.3 1.4 
Cambodia – –  2.8 
China 2.2  4.7  1.1 
India 2.1  2.2  2.4 
Indonesia 2.5  3.0  1.8 
Lao PDR  –  –  2.9 
Malaysia 3.2  3.4  3.2 
Mongolia – –  0.6 
Nepal –  1.8  3.1 
Pakistan 3.1  2.0  2.1 
Philippines 2.9 2.9 2.1 
Sri Lanka  2.1  3.6  2.2 
Thailand 3.1  3.1  0.4 
Vietnam –  –  2.9 
Sources: World Bank (2003). 
 
Table A-6 
Rate of Export Growth in Sample Countries in Different Decades (%) 
Country 1970s  1980s  1990s 
Bangladesh – 10.4  11.7 
Cambodia –  –  22.7 
China 6.9  12.1  17.5 
India 6.4  6.0  13.6 
Indonesia 9.5  1.4  7.7 
Lao PDR  –  –  15.7 
Malaysia 8.1  10.7  12.5 
Mongolia –  – 8.8 
Nepal –  11.5  12.7 
Pakistan 2.6  8.8  5.2 
Philippines 10.3 4.0  8.1 
Sri Lanka  1.8  6.7  – 
Thailand 9.9  14.1  10.8 
Vietnam –  –  27.4 
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Table A-7 
Revenues, Expenditure and Fiscal Deficit in Sample Countries  
in Different Decades (%) 
Revenues Expenditure  Fiscal  Deficit 
Country  1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s 
Bangladesh  6.4  9.1 11.4 13.1 –4.9 –4.0 
Cambodia  4.9 7.5 7.2  12.6  –2.3  –5.1 
China  19.3 12.7 21.9 14.6 –2.7 –1.8 
India  12.7 10.2 19.0 16.5 –6.3 –6.3 
Indonesia  17.1 16.7 19.5 17.4 –2.5 –0.7 
Lao  PDR  5.3 40.4 12.0 70.3 –6.7  –29.9 
Malaysia 24.9 22.8 30.5 23.5 –5.6 –0.8 
Mongolia  –  27.5 –  32.4 –  –5.0 
Nepal  9.4 11.0 19.6 19.2  –10.2 –8.2 
Pakistan 20.4 19.0 29.1 26.6 –8.7 –7.6 
Philippines  14.2 17.4 16.8 19.1 –2.6 –1.7 
Sri  Lanka  21.5 18.3 32.0 28.3  –10.5  –10.0 
Thailand 16.5 17.0 16.0 16.9  0.5  0.0 
Vietnam 13.7 18.2 21.9 21.6 –8.1 –3.4 
Sources: Asian Development Bank (2003). 
 
Table A-8 
Growth in Money Supply and Real Interest Rates in Sample Countries  
in Different Decades (%) 
Money Supply Growth  Real Interest Rate 
Country  1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s 
Bangladesh 20  13  4.7  10.2 
Cambodia –  28  –  9.7 
China 24  25 2.5 2.5 
India 17 17 7.4  6.6 
Indonesia 27  25  11.9  7.3 
Lao PDR  115  51  –  1.2 
Malaysia 11  17  7.1  4.5 
Mongolia –  53  –  45.9 
Nepal 20  19 4.3 5.6 
Pakistan 13  16  4.8  5.4 
Philippines 21  19  5.4  6.4 
Sri Lanka  16  18  1.3  7.8 
Thailand 20  13  9.6  8.0 
Vietnam –  31  –  8.2 
Sources: World Bank  (2003). Pasha and Palanivel  340 
Table A-9 
Rate of Real Depreciation in Exchange Rate and Average Import  
Tariffs in Sample Countries (%) 
Rate of Exchange Rate Depreciation* Average Import Tariff 
Country   1980s 1990s  1990  2000 
Bangladesh 1.2  –1.0  88.2  21.0 
Cambodia –  13.6  –  – 
China 0.8  –1.0  32.5  14.3 
India –0.5  1.1  56.2  28.2 
Indonesia 3.3  13.7  13.2 5.4 
Lao PDR  10.1  1.2  –  14.2 
Malaysia –1.0  0.6  9.9  5.8 
Mongolia –  –47.5  –  – 
Nepal –0.7  0.6  17.5  16.8 
Pakistan 1.3  0.3  46.3  14.7 
Philippines –0.4  –1.7  22.4  4.0 
Sri Lanka  –3.0  –2.9  26.9  7.2 
Thailand –2.1  0.7  33.0  9.7 
Vietnam –  5.4  18.4  15.1 
Sources: World Bank (2003). 
             *A positive rate indicates depreciation in the value of the currency. 
 
APPENDIX  I 
There is need for a discussion of the particular measure used to quantify the 
incidence of poverty. Most studies have used data on poverty incidence based on the 
poverty line of income of US $ 1 (in purchasing power parity terms) per capita per 
day. Alternatively, some studies have looked at changes in income share in the 
bottom quantile of the income distribution as a proxy for changes in poverty [for 
example, Roemer and Gragerty (1997); Dollar and Kraay (2001) and Ghura, Leite 
and Tsangarides (2002)]. Both approaches have been subjected to various forms of 
criticism. The former approach has been criticised by a number of authors [Bhalla 
(2002) and Reddy and Pogge (2002)] on the grounds that the relative purchasing 
power per dollar of the people of poor nations is not measured accurately. The 
estimate of the purchasing power of the poor is based on the measure of their ability 
to buy any of the goods and services an economy has to offer.  However, the poor do 
not generally use services (and services in low income countries are much cheaper in 
relative terms to other goods in the basket in terms of a dollar’s purchasing power Pro-poor Growth and Policies  341 
across countries). Nonetheless, services do get included in their basket of goods, thus 
reflecting an inflated purchasing power of the poor.  
As opposed to this, the latter approach has been found to have the problem 
that the income of the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution cannot be 
assumed to fully represent the income of the poor. In many developing countries, 30 
to 50 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.  
We have relied on estimates of the incidence of poverty based on national 
poverty lines. These estimates are being used perhaps for the first time to analyse the 
relationship between growth and poverty. Given that these estimates are indigenous 
in character and are mostly produced by national statistical organisations, they are 
likely to be more acceptable to national governments. But the basic problem with 
these estimates is their comparability across countries. Since the national poverty 
lines are generally derived as the consumption expenditure required to finance a 
minimum nutritional intake (in calories) by an individual, there is a lack of 
standardisation as reflected by the choice of different minimum nutritional level in 
different countries. However, if the analysis is not with respect to the levels of 
poverty but with regard to changes in the incidence of poverty then the problem is 
likely to be less serious.  
Our primary motivation for choosing poverty estimates based on national 
rather that international poverty line (of US$ 1 PPP per capita per day) is that the 
direction of change highlighted by the two approaches tends to be different for a 
number of countries, especially during the decade of the 90s. As can be seen 
from Table B-1, out of 14 countries in the sample for the 90s there is divergence 
in trends revealed by the two approaches for five countries, namely, Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan. Differences are particularly 
pronounced in the case of the last three countries. Indonesia and Malaysia went 
through an economic crisis after 1997 and the former, in particular, experienced 
a severe contraction in its GDP. Poverty estimates in the immediate aftermath of 
the Asian financial crisis revealed that the incidence had increased sharply. 
While there has been some economic recovery since then, it is hardly likely that 
poverty could have fallen as sharply as indicated by estimates based on the 
international poverty line. Similarly, Pakistan has experienced low growth during 
the decade of the 90s and the common perception is that poverty has increased 
significantly during this period. Today, the government of Pakistan is placing a 
high emphasis on reducing poverty and unemployment. According to estimates 
based on the poverty line of US $ 1 PPP per capita per day, the incidence of 
poverty in Pakistan has fallen from as much as 48 percent in 1990 to 31 percent 
in 1996. This seems very unlikely.  Pasha and Palanivel  342 
Table B-1 














According to the 
National Poverty 
Line 
Bangladesh  Increase Decrease Increase Decrease 
Cambodia –  –  Decrease  Increase 
China  Decrease Decrease Decrease Decrease 
India  Decrease Decrease Decrease Decrease 
Indonesia Decrease  Decrease  Decrease  Increase 
Lao PDR  –  –  Decrease  Decrease 
Malaysia Decrease  Decrease  Decrease  Increase 
Mongolia –  –  –  Increase 
Nepal Decrease  Increase  –  Increase 
Pakistan Decrease  Decrease  Decrease  Increase 
Philippines  Decrease Decrease Decrease Decrease 
Sri Lanka  Decrease  Decrease  Increase  Increase 
Thailand Decrease  Increase  Decrease  Decrease 
Vietnam –  –  Decrease  Decrease 
Source: World Bank, 2003, various tables from Pasha and Palanivel, 2003. 
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I am excited to be a discussant on this important paper. I am excited because 
the subject is close to my heart. 
In the absence of a written paper to review, however, it is very difficult to 
offer meaningful comments, especially when a super-smart speaker like Dr Hafiz 
Pasha makes the presentation. Under the circumstances I shall be very brief in my 
remarks. 
The core message coming out of the presentation is that inflation does not 
matter in the menu of pro-poor policies followed by the Asian countries. This is what 
a multi-equation econometric models tell the authors of the paper entitled, “Pro-poor 
Policies: The Asian Experience”. If the conclusions emerging from sophisticated 
econometric models do not jibe with economic common sense then they should be 
taken with a pinch of salt. To say that there is no relationship between inflation and 
growth is perhaps far fetched. 
General experience and economic common sense tell us that inflation has both 
direct and indirect effects on the poor in more than one ways. Let me explain my 
position on this point. 
First of all, most of the poor are unemployed or severely under-employed. 
They do not have enough to eat in the first place. If on the top of it prices are rising, 
especially that of the foodstuff and other essential commodities, then the burden on 
the poor rises disproportionately. Also we know both from economic theory and 
actual experience, that a high level of inflation distorts savers as well as investor’s 
behaviour pattern. If inflation is high and rates on saving instruments are low, the 
negative interest rates will discourage savings. At the same time investors would go 
for speculative profits or investments in real estate rather than long term investments 
in production process in manufacturing activities. If the revenue elasticity is not high 
enough to match with nominal rate of GDP growth, the deficit financing ensues 
which may further accentuate inflationary pressures depending on the sources of 
deficit financing. More importantly, expectations of a rising trend in prices may itself 
worsen inflationary pressure. Therefore, in light of all theses common sense 
observation my feeling is that inflation does matter even though in econometric may 
tell us otherwise. It quite possible that in some countries inflation in a certain range 
may not show an impact on growth, but hyperinflation, as in Indonesia in 1960, 
and/or zero inflation signalling recessionary conditions, does matter both for growth 
prospects and job opportunity for the poor. Fateh M. Chaudhry 
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In my judgment not only inflation matters but also certain non-economic 
factors matter even more for the poor in order to beat the poverty trap. Most critical 
in this category are; (i) the sustainability of the right kind of macro-economic, and 
sectoral policies, (ii) political stability for a duration of time, (iii) human resource 
development on a wide scale, (iv) security of life and property, and (v) the rule of 
law in general. If these factors are focused upon and the pattern of growth throw up 
ample opportunities for the employment of the poor who already have been endowed 
with skill and some assets, then the poor may benefit from the growth process, 
otherwise they will be by passed and the poverty will deepen. 
 






It is indeed a great honour to be a discussant on the paper presented by Dr 
Hafiz Pasha. The paper deals with a topic of great importance to the developing 
countries, particularly in Asia and Africa. 
The analysis is sound and robust. The authors have made an ambitious effort 
to capture the diverse experience of 14 countries in Asia over the past three decades. 
Findings are interesting and highly valuable. Most of the conclusions are plausible 
and in harmony with the findings of other researchers. The recommendations, based 
on the analysis, are equally solid and appealing. 
The paper has re-validated the findings of earlier researches that showed a 
strong association between economic growth and poverty. It has rightly underlined 
the importance of achieving and sustaining a high rate of economic growth in 
lowering the incidence of poverty. 
The paper has revealed that, despite a great divergence in the systems of 
governance and resource ownership, there are many similarities in the policies and 
programmes adopted for promotion of growth in various countries. The degree of 
reduction in poverty in response to economic growth was, however, different 
depending on the composition of growth. A rapid drop in poverty was experienced 
when high growth rates were achieved and sustained over time in agriculture and off-
farm rural sectors. The gain in poverty reduction was even higher, where the growth 
in these two sectors was accompanied by measures that reduced income inequalities, 
improved access to assets/landownership by the poor. Continuity of policies, national 
capacity to implement and adequacy of infrastructure, both institutional and physical, 
have had a significant influence on growth and its impact on poverty. 
The analysis rightly shows that the reduction in poverty comes through 
employment generation which, in turn, is influenced by the choice of technology and 
degree of effective functioning of the labour market. It also shows that economic 
growth is pro-poor, when achieved by encouraging investment in sectors and areas 
where the poor work and live and that greatest impact on agricultural productivity 
and poverty comes from investment in agricultural research and extension, roads, 
irrigation, village electrification and agro-based industries. 
The findings about the lack of sensitivity of poverty to inflation and exports 
are apparently less plausible. Further work should be done, using data from countries 
and regions that experienced very high rates of inflation and where exports largely 
comprise primary commodities and the products of labour-intensive industries. 
Recommendations on the use of fiscal, monetary and trade policies in support 
of accelerated economic growth are sound. However, their impact on inflation should 
be closely monitored since it affects the real wages of the poor. The recommendation Dilawar Ali Khan  348
on enhanced public sector investment in the expansion of physical and institutional 
infrastructure is equally sound. Redistribution of assets through measures such as 
land reforms is highly desirable and rightly emphasised in the paper. However, half-
hearted and poorly implemented reforms, without adequate improvements in the 
related areas, could easily be counter-productive. Pakistan’s experience in this area is 
quite revealing. Our country failed to achieve either the intended impact on 
redistribution of assets and/or an improvement in productivity. 
The reliability and comparability of data across countries and over time poses 
serious limitations on the study, since most of the countries have been under 
different systems. Some countries are still in a transition phase. Totalitarian and 
autocratic regimes generally have the tendency of manipulating data to claim better 
results in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction. These and other similar 
reasons, depreciate the value of some of the conclusions drawn by the authors. 
Pakistan’s experience of achieving a rapid decline in poverty despite low 
economic growth in the 70s quoted in the paper lacks credibility. Moreover, the long 
term impact of some of the irresponsible socialist policies adopted in the 70s was 
disastrous for the national economy. Such policies can hardly be recommended for 
replication at home or elsewhere. 
The paper has focused only at the income dimension of poverty. Equally 
important aspects like education, health and access to other basic social services have 
been ignored South Asia’s record, with the exception of Sri Lanka, in addressing 
these aspects of poverty, has been quite dismal. 
The paper has also failed to analyse the impact of fertility reduction on 
poverty. In East Asia and Sri Lanka, a rapid drop in fertility concurrently with 
sustained economic growth, made an important contribution to poverty reduction and 
an overall improvement in the quality of life. The countries experiencing either a 
slow decline or even a rise in poverty, have failed to achieve the desired level of drop 
in fertility. Rapid population growth in these countries is continuing to exacerbate 
the problems of unemployment, poor quality of life and environmental degradation. 
Since only aggregated data were used in the analysis, the paper could not 
capture the wide regional and gender disparities that still exist even in countries that 
have been experiencing rapid economic growth. 
On the whole, the authors have made a valuable contribution to the literature 
on economic growth and poverty, clearly identifying the conditions that make the 
macro policies more pro-poor. I hope my comments will be considered by the 
authors while pursuing further research on this or related themes. 
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